

























THE CONTEMPORARY QUARREL BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE AND LITERATURE? 
REFLECTIONS ON PERFORMANCE (AND) PHILOSOPHY 




The title of this paper alludes, of course, to the famous reference in Book X of Plato’s Republic to 
the ‘ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy’.1 It is a significant formulation for many 
reasons, not least because it seems to mark in a memorable way a defining insight into the 
originary self-understanding of philosophy, wherein philosophy defines itself through its 
opposition to poetry because of their purportedly differing relations to truth—philosophy serving 
truth directly, poetry having, at best, a secondary or ancillary relationship to truth, and, at worst, 
a distorting or obscuring one. It is this conviction that has Plato exclude poets from the polis. Of 
course, it has long been recognised that there is a certain degree of self-deception in this 
thumbnail sketch of philosophy’s self-understanding. The Platonic dialogues are in many ways 
very obviously literary, and much subsequent philosophy has sought to explore and even exploit 
this proximity to the poetic. Similarly, it can be argued that from Romanticism onwards an 
important characteristic of modernity has been the renegotiation of poetry’s relationship with 
truth, with an emphasis, typically, on rejecting Platonic metaphysics and establishing some sort of 
philosophical efficaciousness for poetry and art more generally.  
But what is ‘the contemporary quarrel between performance and literature’ that the title of this 
essay directly names—even if, given the question mark, only as a hypothetical possibility—and 
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what does it have to do with the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry? This is what the 
two argumentative movements in this article will attempt to make clear. What motivates these 
arguments is a conviction that there exists an equation, or strong commonality, between poetry 
as it was conceived by the ancients, literature as it was theorised in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and performance as it might be understood today. First, it will be argued that from our 
perspective it is more appropriate to understand the ancient quarrel as being between 
philosophy and performance. Second, it will be proposed that the principle of performance that 
Plato objected to is at the heart of an influential contemporary understanding of literature, and 
that it is what is often identified as characterising literature’s radical potential and appeal—an 
appeal that can be seen particularly clearly in the way literature was figured in the linguistic turn 
in the humanities and the theory explosion of the 1960s and 1970s. What ultimately undergirds 
this shifting confluence of terms is something that we might call the principle of performance, 
which poetry, performance, literature, and even philosophy, have, at various times and to varying 
degrees, accommodated and celebrated. In conclusion, it will be asked how well the emergent 
movement of Performance Philosophy might be expected to accommodate this principle of 
performance and whether, in fact, as might be suspected, it risks re-inscribing, reiterating, 
perhaps even re-citing, philosophy’s foundational rejection of the principle of performance. 
The ancient quarrel between philosophy and performance 
Plato famously considered poetry dangerous, a threat to truth, because it is mimetic. Without 
further elaboration this sort of statement tells us very little and might even be unintentionally 
misleading. It certainly does not translate particularly intuitively to our experience of poetry. 
What, for instance, is T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land imitative of, and why would we consider it a 
threat? Moreover, although there is a long tradition of politically subversive poetry, is there 
anything today less threatening to the political status quo than poets and poetry? Part of the 
difficulty, I think, lies in the fact that although ‘poetry’ is an accurate lexical translation of poiētikē, 
the word that Plato uses, it, on its own, does not do the work of cultural and conceptual 
translation that is needed to avoid potential misunderstandings. The word poiētikē is derived 
from the word poiētai, meaning literally ‘the art of the poiētai’ (Nagy 2010, 378), who were 
composers and often performers of mousikē, the art of the muses, which covers ‘the various 
media of poetry and song and dance and instrumental music’ (371). Mousikē, from which we get 
the word ‘music’, is sometimes rendered as ‘poetry’ in English translations of Plato (see, for 
example, Ferrari 1989, 92, fn. 1), and this slippage is indicative. As G.R.F. Ferrari observes, ‘In 
Plato’s culture, live performance was the norm’ (Ferrari 1989, 92). What is referred to as ‘poetry’ 
would typically have involved music and dance as well, and citizens would have experienced it 
either as members of an audience or, indeed, as performers themselves. Ferrari makes this point 
wryly clear when he says that ‘in order to gauge Plato’s critique we must first banish any image of 
the serious reader curled quietly in an armchair with the Iliad’ (93). In light of this relatively 
uncertain cultural terrain, it is essential to reconstruct carefully Plato’s arguments against poetry. 
In doing so, it should become clear that what is objected to is closer to what today we would 
understand as performance, particularly performance as it is understood and experienced in the 
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age of postdramatic theatre. From this, it will be argued that it is possible to identify what might 
be called a principle of performance.  
One of the first things to note is that Plato, or Socrates, identifies an acceptable use of mimesis as 
well as an unacceptable use, and their difference is instructive. In their purest form, Socrates 
suggests, there are two narrative styles (Plato 2003, 392c–d, 396b–c, 397b). The first—most 
simple—kind is what today would be understood as third-person narration, where, as Socrates 
puts it, ‘the poet speaks in person [and] does not attempt to direct our imagination towards 
anyone else, or suggest that someone other than himself is speaking’. The second kind, which 
today might be understood as imitative performance, is where the poet imitates someone—or 
something—and ‘does everything he can to make us imagine’ that it is no longer the poet 
speaking (393a–b). The distinction between the two types of narration is broadly that of diegesis 
and mimesis, though whereas those modes might typically be thought of in terms of text-bound 
literary conventions, for Plato the act of performative dissimulation required by mimesis would 
involve much more than mere syntactical effects. The move from diegesis to mimesis would be a 
move from a narrow and restrained mode of delivery to something much more fully enacted, 
which might incorporate, for instance, non-verbal sounds, physical gestures, mannerisms, 
costumes, music, rhythm and so on. Plato sees a complex moral, political, psychological and 
philosophical dimension to these narrative styles, and there can be no doubt that he judges the 
second form of narrative negatively. 
Typically, a poet would draw on both styles, mixing them together to varying degrees, and this 
allows Socrates to make an important distinction between the acceptable and unacceptable uses 
of imitation. There are two broad tendencies: first, the tendency to use imitation very sparingly 
and only when what is to be imitated is admirable, edifying, or at the very least morally sound; 
second, the tendency to use imitation indulgently, copying anything and everything, doing so 
without restriction, and using all manner of tricks to that effect. The first will appeal to what Plato, 
or Socrates, calls the ‘decent man’, who, because of his nature, will imitate only the ‘saying or 
action of a good man’, refusing to imitate someone acting in an unworthy or disreputable 
manner (Plato 2003, 395c). This approach to storytelling will result in a combination of third 
person narrative and imitative performance weighted very heavily towards the former. As 
Socrates puts it: ‘[t]he way he tells stories will combine both styles, imitation and the other kind of 
narrative, but with only a small amount of imitation even in a long story’ (396e). But this is not 
simply a question of the quantity of imitative performance, but the quality of it too: it will be 
limited in range and scope according to what is appropriate for a ‘decent man’ (which in turn 
connects it with ‘truth’). 
The second approach, in contrast, appeals to the sort of person who is ‘not of this sort’, that is, 
not decent. ‘The worse he is’, argues Socrates, ‘the more prepared he will be to use imitation all 
the time’ (Plato 2003, 397a); or, as an alternative version of Plato’s text yields the translation, ‘the 
more prepared he will be to narrate anything and everything’ (Plato 1998, 397a). Socrates goes 
on: 
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There is nothing he will regard as beneath him, and so he will take it upon himself, 
in all seriousness, and at public performances, to imitate all the things we were 
talking about just now—thunder, the din of wind and hail, of wheels and pulleys, 
the sound of trumpet, pipe, panpipe, and every musical instrument, even the 
noise of dogs, or sheep, or birds (Plato 2003, 397a–b). 
Socrates asks: ‘Will the way this man tells stories consist entirely of imitation, in word and 
gesture, with maybe a small element of narrative?’ His interlocutor replies that ‘it’s bound to’ 
(397b). 
Socrates thereby establishes ‘two styles of storytelling’, both involving mimesis, but only one of 
which he considers acceptable in the ideal city-state he envisages. The first, the mode 
appropriate to the decent man, is limited in range and ‘involves only slight variations’. The other, 
‘[b]ecause of the enormous range of variations it contains’ draws on ‘all the musical modes, and 
every kind of rhythm’ (397b–c). This sort of multi-faceted, unrestricted, all-out performance is not 
‘in tune’ with the political regime Socrates subscribes to, where men ‘do not have a dual or 
manifold nature, since each of them performs only one task’ (397e). Therefore this latter kind of 
poet ought not to be allowed in the city, even though his art is, Socrates admits, ‘by far the most 
enjoyable’ (397d). This in itself is very interesting as it points to a particular tension: namely that 
for imitative performance to be politically, morally and philosophically acceptable, its tendency to 
develop freely into a more fully performative mode of expression, a tendency otherwise 
encouraged by audiences who take pleasure in it, must be restricted. What is being objected to, 
then, is, from a twenty-first century perspective, perhaps not so much ‘poetry’, or even ‘imitation’ 
per se, but rather something we might call, as yet rather vaguely, unrestricted performance. 
This seems a long way from the famous discussion in Book X that uses the rather unhelpful 
example of furniture-making to indict the mimetic arts. Even this, however, can be read in such a 
way as to yield support for the idea that what is being objected to is, first and foremost, the 
general lack of restriction that performance represents. Socrates asserts that the craftsman does 
not create the real couch or bed; he creates ‘[s]omething like the real thing, but not itself the real 
thing’. It remains, he says, somewhat ‘shadowy by comparison with truth’ (Plato 2003, 597a–b). 
However, the suggestion is that the craftsman’s bed is a higher order form of imitation than, for 
instance, a painting of a bed. This is usually quickly grasped as meaning that the painter’s bed is 
no more than a copy of the craftsman’s own copy, thus situating the painter’s bed at ‘two 
removes from nature’ (597e). It is not simply a copy of an original, then, but a copy of a copy. But, 
one might ask, could the painter not be copying the original idea or form of a bed rather than the 
craftsman’s imperfect realisation of that idea? In other words, why must the painter’s realisation 
of a bed be further removed from truth than the craftsman’s? The answer to this perhaps 
concerns a difference in the realisation of both beds in relation to what one might call the ‘end-
user’. The craftsman creates the bed with knowledge of how the bed will be used. This is a skill 
developed over time by listening to what the people who acquire and use his furniture tell him. If 
the idea of a bed dictates that it should serve a particular function and have particular qualities, 
then the end-user will be able to provide feedback on how successfully realised as a bed the 
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craftsman’s is. This means that the craftsman accumulates a knowledge—or a ‘correct opinion’— 
about what, in this context, is a good bed, or even a true bed (601e–602a). The craftsman’s 
imitations are, therefore, informed by knowledge.  
The great mistake and great danger, Socrates believes, is to think that the mimetic arts are 
similarly informed by knowledge. In order to understand his point, it is worth thinking about what 
the relationship of, say, the painter is to the end-user of his imitation. The end-user, the person 
experiencing the painting of the bed, does not, of course, experience the bed as a bed. He or she 
experiences it as a representation. The painter therefore has licence to present the painting of 
the bed to the end-user in a manner that is not influenced or restricted by considerations about 
the end-user as a bed-user. In other words, what the painter of the bed picture appeals to in the 
end-user is not the knowledge and experience of a bed-user — at least, typically, not first and 
foremost. It is possible to imagine painterly representation restricted by considerations that 
would affect a bed-user qua bed-user. The resulting image might appeal to end-users interested 
in the craftsmanship of beds and who possess a rather limited appreciation of painting, but it is 
unlikely to satisfy the intended end-user—who is not primarily a bed-user, but rather someone 
who takes pleasure in representations. This becomes even clearer if, rather than thinking about 
the craftsman who makes a bed in relation to the painter who paints one, we think instead of the 
same craftsman in relation to an artist, a sculptor, let us say, who is representing a bed in the 
medium of wood. Both are representing a bed and both are using wood in order to do so. The 
craftsman, however, is restricted by his knowledge of what makes a good bed intended to be 
used as a bed. The artist, on the other hand, does not suffer the same restriction as she is 
appealing to an audience that will experience the bed as an artwork—something not to be used 
as a bed but rather to be enjoyed aesthetically. Of course, there are still restrictions of taste and 
convention that may influence the artist’s rendering of the bed, but generally, by Socrates’ own 
admission, we take most pleasure in art that flouts convention and taste and is allowed to 
develop freely under its own impetus and according to its own nature—autotelically and 
autonomously, we might say. 
So, on this reading, the decoupling of the mimetic arts from knowledge, correct opinion, truth 
and so on, should be understood as a certain kind of freedom. Socrates, indeed, refers to it as ‘a 
kind of play’ (602b). However it is still unclear why this kind of imitation—think of Van Gogh’s 
Bedroom in Arles paintings, or Tracy Emin’s My Bed—should be considered threatening. This is 
where the example of furniture is decidedly unhelpful. The stakes become clearer, however, if 
rather than thinking of a bed, one applies the same ideas to something like human virtue, for 
instance. Unrestricted imitative performance, freed from any responsibility to a priori ideas of 
truth, can present what might otherwise be considered inappropriate human behaviour in a 
beguiling and pleasurable way, thereby undermining and questioning received ideas about 
human virtue. 
This once again brings us to the question of the end-user. If the success of the artistic imitation 
does not depend on its relationship with a priori conceptions of knowledge and truth, then on 
what other basis might it be considered successful? In other words, to what in us does this kind 
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of play appeal? What is it that disposes us to bracket or reconfigure what we might consider to be 
a correct opinion about the world in order to entertain other possibilities? To answer this 
question one must have an understanding of the nature of man according to Socrates. He 
suggests that the soul of man is divided into a rational part, which ‘puts its trust in measurement 
and calculation’ and is constrained by a conservative tendency that sets great store by custom, 
and a non-rational part that thrives on more subjective stimuli such as visual and poetic 
representation, as well as emotionality and affectivity (Plato 2003, 603a). These two parts lead to 
different behaviours and conclusions about the world depending on which has greatest 
influence, and they find themselves accommodated by very different styles of poetry. The 
rational part is inherently resistant to imitation. It is ‘hard to imitate, and not a simple matter to 
understand if it is imitated’; the other, ‘fretful’, element, by contrast, ‘is highly susceptible to all 
sorts of varied imitation’ (604e), and is thus a natural match for a more fully developed form of 
performance. So there seems to be an inherent conflict between knowledge, reason, truth, 
custom and imitative performance. Socrates comments that ‘[t]he imitative poet’s nature is 
obviously not adapted to this element in the soul, nor is his wisdom framed to appeal to it’. If he 
is going to be ‘popular with the general public’ he must attend to ‘the fretful, variegated 
character’, which is not only more amenable to performance—because it is ‘easy [or easier] to 
imitate’—but it also sets fewest restrictions on his performative art and, indeed, is actually 
encouraged by the audience’s response to exercise itself freely (605a). 
Unbounded mimetic performance, then, manifesting a fundamental irresponsibility towards 
established ideas of knowledge and truth, ‘arouses and feeds’ what Socrates calls the ‘inferior 
part of the soul’ and in doing so ‘destroys the rational part’ (605b). This is what Socrates (and 
Plato, one assumes) objects to: a deformation or obscuring of truth as an unintended but, as they 
would see it, likely consequence of unrestricted performance. Of course, this need not be viewed 
negatively. Indeed, it is perhaps the fundamental irresponsibility of mimetic performance, its 
exuberant autotelicity and disclocation from a priori conceptions of truth and knowledge, which 
makes it valuable as an essentially creative act. It is important to understand the extent and 
capacity of this creativity. On Socrates’ charge, for instance, this distortion or defiguring of the 
world is a form of fiction (though he has no word for fiction) capable of instituting its own world. 
The imitation, in other words, has the power to create its own original, and we find this process 
inherently pleasurable and compelling. Rather than producing a faithful copy, then, exaggerated, 
unbounded, performative mimesis is sufficiently removed from any a priori model for its 
productions to be viewed as something new and alternative. This is ‘copy’ in its original sense of 
copia, meaning abundance, plenty, multitude, and it stands in opposition to what Derrida called 
‘mimetologism’, ‘the interpretation of mimesis as imitation, or even as representation’ (Lacoue-
Labarthe 1998, 26). It is mimesis on the side of difference, not on the side of the same. ‘We know 
how beguiling we ourselves find her’, says Socrates, ‘But it is wrong to abandon what we believe 
to be true’ (607c b–d). This is the crux, of course: poetry, when allowed to develop without 
restriction, assumes all manner of performative expression—rhythm, dance, music, song and so 
on —and thereby allows us, even encourages us, to move beyond what we believe to be true, 
reconfiguring the way the world appears to us, redrawing in a different place the dividing line 
between the possible and the impossible.  
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One could substantiate this argument further by drawing on other Platonic works such as Ion and 
the Laws, but the dialectic of pleasure, subversion and developing performative expression 
should now be sufficiently clear and understandable as attesting to a quarrel more aptly framed 
from today’s perspective as being between philosophy and performance, rather than between 
philosophy and poetry. But what exactly might be meant by ‘performance’ in this context? Is a 
more precise definition possible? Of course, there are numerous influential accounts of 
performance given by the likes of Marvin Carlson (1996), Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008), Shannon 
Jackson (2006), Jon McKenzie (2001), Peggy Phelan (1996), Richard Schechner (2004) and many 
others, and wealth of scholarship on performativity from J.L. Austin (1962) to Judith Butler 
(1997,1999, 2011). In order to account for what Plato objects to, a simpler, broader definition 
might, tentatively, be hazarded, whereby performance is simply anything done or experienced 
intentionally and for its own sake—any deliberate, autotelic act, in other words. On this 
understanding, although performance might give rise to, say, pleasure, it remains autotelic 
insofar as that pleasure is integral to the performance, the performance being an expression of 
that pleasure. This pleasure—using the term broadly—taken in doing something deliberately and 
for its own sake encourages the development of the doing of that act, a sense of care entwined 
with the practice. This, in a nutshell, is precisely what Socrates disapproves of. If performance can 
be limited to serving particular moral, religious and philosophical ends—‘telling nothing but 
medicinal or noble lies’ as Stanley Rosen (1993, 3) puts it—then it is allowed to remain within the 
polis. If, however, it is done autotelically, then it is judged dangerous and irresponsible and is 
excluded. As has already been noted, Socrates calls this kind of autotelicity ‘play’. It is unrestricted 
by external considerations, and any artistic conventions that shape it are expected to evolve 
through its own experiential development, in a kind of self-regulating, continually active feedback 
loop. On these grounds one might make the case for a certain autonomy of performance, in 
addition to its autotelicity. This is not to deny the social situatedness of such performance, simply 
the fundamental irresponsibility that it embodies. As Adorno puts it in Aesthetic Theory: ‘[A]rt 
becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art’ 
(1997, 225). 
Poetry unbound 
Now, this definition is arguably so loose as to accommodate all art, and insofar as an artwork is 
created or experienced autotelically—a not uncommon modern understanding of art—then it 
may indeed be granted that such processual production and experiencing do qualify as 
performance. However, the modern, highly theorised conception of ‘literature’ is perhaps a 
particularly exemplary case here. Indeed, one might argue that in the explosion of continental 
theory in the 1960s and 1970s, which had such an influence upon the humanities in academia, 
‘literature’, or, more especially, the idea of literature, came to stand for this principle of 
performance—this radically unbounded autotelicity that stages the suspension of what is taken 
to be truth, knowledge, correct opinion—thereby providing a space in which, without being 
named as such, that principle could be reaffirmed and further theorised. 
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The conditions for the emergence of this conception of literature can be traced back to the early 
German Romantics, who have been understood as inaugurating a period—one that, arguably, we 
still occupy—in which poetry assumes and explores a constitutive autotelicity, and where 
literature is idealised as the institution that preserves and safeguards that principle. Alain Badiou 
names the epoch in which this regime is operative and preeminent as ‘the age of the poets’ 
(2014). In the Athenaeum fragment 116, Friedrich Schlegel characterises ‘Romantic poetry’ as 
always being in a ‘state of becoming’: 
that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be 
perfected. [...] It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognises as its first 
commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself. The 
romantic kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it were, 
poetry itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be romantic (Schlegel 
1971, 175–6). 
Hegel describes this aesthetic autotelicity as art’s ‘self-transcendence’ (Hegel 1975, 607) and 
Maurice Blanchot, in his essay ‘The Athenaeum’, claims that with early German Romanticism 
‘literature’ emerges in its radical modern guise, becoming conscious of itself as a discourse that 
has no proper characteristic other than the ongoing expression of itself in its ceaseless, 
unrestricted self-becoming: 
Literature (by which I mean all its forms of expression, which is to say also its 
forces of dissolution) suddenly becomes conscious of itself, manifests itself, and, 
in this manifestation, has no other task or trait than to declare itself (Blanchot 
2008, 354). 
Thus, simply being what it is—that is to say, being nothing besides the boundless potentiality of 
its own manifestation—literature, thus conceived, is a constant challenge to itself, endlessly 
undermining what it has been taken to be. ‘[P]oetry’, Blanchot writes, ‘will no longer be content to 
produce beautiful, determinate works, but rather will produce itself in a movement without term 
and without determination’ (354). This ‘declarative mode’ amounts to an inevitable and unending 
self-interrogation. It is ‘the inexhaustible act that institutes and constitutes the being of literature’ 
(355). Jean-Luc Nancy, also heavily influenced by early German Romanticism (see Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy, 1988), develops this idea: 
‘Poetry’ does not exactly have a sense; rather it has the sense of an access to a 
sense that is each time absent, and postponed until later. The sense of ‘poetry’ is 
a sense that is always still to be made. [...] Poetry is in essence something more 
and something other than poetry itself. [...] Poetry does not coincide with itself: 
perhaps this non-coincidence, this essential improperness or impropriety, is 
properly what makes poetry what it is (Nancy 2006, 4). 
Like Blanchot, Nancy draws out the critical implications of this essential creativity, commenting 
that poetry ‘may be deemed what it is only insofar as it is (at the very least) capable of negating 
itself, in the sense of renouncing, denying or abolishing itself’. Poetry, in its very being, thus 
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manifests, or performs, a fundamental irresponsibility or indifference towards established 
norms: ‘By negating itself, poetry denies that the access to sense may be equated with any given 
mode of expression or figuration’ (4). 
The parallels with the form of unbounded mimetic performance rejected by Plato should be 
obvious. Furthermore, it should now also be possible to see that this form of mimesis is simply 
the manifestation of the logic of mimesis taken to its most extreme—and most coherent—
consequence. In fact, if what is being called the principle of performance is determined by 
anything, it is by a fidelity to the properly improper, or purely impure, truth of mimesis, whereby 
mimesis cannot be except through the appropriation of that which, properly, it is not. Thus, the 
minimal constitution of mimesis itself ensures that it is little more than the challenging and 
undermining of propriety. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe points out, ‘what is “proper” to mimesis’ 
lies precisely in the fact that ‘mimesis has no “proper” to it, ever (so that mimesis does not consist 
in the improper, either, or in who knows what “negative” essence, but ek-sists, or better yet, “de-
sists” in this appropriation of everything supposedly proper that necessarily jeopardises property 
“itself”)’. Thus, if the ‘essence’ of mimesis is ‘precisely absolute vicariousness, carried to the limit 
(but inexhaustible)’, the principle of performance, in its various guises, is an affirmation of this 
impropriety (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 116).  
As has already been indicated, Derrida distinguishes between this understanding of mimesis as 
an essentially creative and unbounded appropriation2—the form of mimesis rejected by Plato—
and mimetologism's faithful imitation or representation of pre-existing truths and received ideas. 
It is through this lens that Rodolphe Gasché attempts to clarify the radical potential of the idea of 
literature that emerged from Romanticism and then came prominently to the fore with the 
theory explosion in the humanities in the latter half of the twentieth century. Gasché argues that 
for most of its history, literature has been something other than literature—or literature only 
secondarily. He writes that ‘Aristotle’s production of the concept of literature in the Poetics (in the 
aftermath of Plato’s determination of poetry as mimesis) inaugurates the history of literature as a 
history in which the certification of literature’s birth, the declaration of its name, coincides with its 
disappearance’. This understanding of literature, forged according to the demands of 
mimetologism, restricts the principle of performance by enthralling literature to the demands 
and expectations of philosophy. As Gasché puts it: ‘The interpretation of mimesis as subject to 
truth, as a mimetologism that proclaims the priority and precedence of the imitated over 
imitation, subjects literature to a status of metaphoric secondariness’ (Gasché 1997, 256). One 
consequence of the Romantic break with this conception of literature was a move to claim for 
literature something proper to itself—the ‘literary’, ‘literariness’ or ‘literarity’. But, once again, this 
would be to impose an ontological restriction upon literature that would require it to manifest 
literariness in order to be ‘itself’. Derrida is clear that ‘there is no text which is literary in itself’: 
‘Literarity is not a natural essence, an intrinsic property of the text’ (Derrida 2002, 44). Although 
the impulse to isolate and identify something proper to literature might be understood as being 
motivated by a rejection of the mimetological conception of literature, it is in fact similarly 
limiting, subjugating the autotelic play of literature to an idea that exists independently of it. As 
Derrida writes, the notion of ‘pure literature [...] risks limiting the play, restricting it’ (Derrida 1976, 
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59). Gasché concludes that ‘[m]imetologism and literarity are the birth and death of literature 
through philosophy’ (Gasché 1997, 257).  
It is in this context that the full complexity of Derrida’s famous assertion that ‘there is no—or 
hardly any, ever so little—literature’ (Derrida 1981, 223) starts to become apparent. Literature, 
understood without subjection to mimetologism or to formalist ideas of literariness, is little more 
than the affirmation of the potentially unlimited and inexhaustible invention and development 
that results from deliberate and autotelic doing, and which I am suggesting can be understood as 
the principle of performance. In this sense, then, there is very little, almost nothing, that is proper 
to literature—there is, one might say, nothing to it. But, in another sense, because historically 
there has been such scant recognition of literature’s ontological indigence—fuller philosophical 
determinations of it having been favoured instead—there is, materially, very little literature 
worthy of the name. It is precisely this minimally-constituted conception of literature that 
challenges both philosophy and what, previously, has been considered literature, by being willing 
to suspend, in its very manifestation, any tenet or practice. Literature, theorised in this way, is a 
discourse that affirms its readiness to forgo the foregoing in the jouissance of its own autotelicity. 
This is literature that, in Roland Barthes’ words, ‘imposes a state of loss, [...] discomforts [...], 
unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his 
tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language’ (Barthes 1998, 14). From 
this sort of perspective, as Gasché observes, ‘Literature becomes a radical interrogation of 
philosophy, and of most past literature as well, not only by refusing its foundation in a preceding 
and prior being of meaning but also by disclaiming any formal essence as concerns its substance 
of expression’ (258). Hence Derrida’s claim that ‘the subversion of logocentrism [is] announced 
better than elsewhere, today, in a certain sector and certain determined form of “literary” 
practice’ (Derrida 1982, 11). But, of course, if this conception of literature is indeed, as I am 
arguing, ‘simply’ the latest manifestation and affirmation of the principle of performance—which 
Plato himself had perceived as such a threat to what Derrida calls ‘logocentrism’—then this 
should hardly be surprising. The important point, though, is that this critical—indeed, 
philosophical—capacity of literature is secondary and in no way compromises literature’s 
autotelicity by means of some sort of concession to an instrumentalising critical function. To 
reiterate Blanchot, literature is interrogative in its declarative mode—a declarativity without 
restriction. It is for this reason that Derrida identifies a fundamental co-dependence between 
‘literature’ (understood, of course, in this very particular way) and democracy: 
Literature is a modern invention, inscribed in conventions and institutions which, 
to hold on to just this trait, secure in principle its right to say everything. Literature 
thus ties its destiny to a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic freedom 
(freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.). No democracy without literature; 
no literature without democracy (Derrida 1995, 28). 
Literature, for Derrida, then, is thus ‘the institution which allows one to say everything, in every 
way’: 
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The space of literature is not only that of an instituted fiction but also a fictive 
institution which in principle allows one to say everything. To say everything is no 
doubt to gather, by translating, all figures into one another, to totalise by 
formalising, but to say everything is also to break out of [franchir] prohibitions. To 
affranchise oneself [s’affranchir]—in every field where law can lay down the law 
(Derrida 1992, 36). 
This critical, performative autotelicity of literature is compellingly articulated by Derek Attridge in 
his essay ‘Singular Events: Literature, Invention, and Performance’ (2002) and, subsequently, in 
The Singularity of Literature (2004). Attridge identifies the ‘peculiar potency of literature’ as 
attributable to its ‘singularity and inventiveness’. Here, ‘[s]ingularity names the quality whereby a 
cultural object of a certain kind differs from all others, not as a particular manifestation of 
general rules but as a uniqueness perceived as resisting or exceeding all general determinations’. 
Whereas ‘[i]nventiveness is [...] the capacity of a cultural product to bring about a refashioning of 
the norms and habits on which we regularly rely in our understanding of such products’ (2002, 
50). Literature, then, would be understood as an event of singularity and inventiveness, which, 
crucially, Attridge insists, is experienced ‘as event’. ‘Another way of putting this’, Attridge writes, ‘is 
that the literary text exists, as literary text, only in performance’. He suggests that he chooses ‘the 
term performance because it points to that element of self-distance that is present in the event of 
the literary, the event comprehended in its eventness’ (56). I take this to be an affirmation of 
literature’s autotelicity, whereby it is experienced deliberately and for its own sake. This is what 
sets literature apart from every other use of language: 
Most of the sentences we read or hear we do not perform, in this sense; we 
recognise, apprehend, interpret them, perhaps feel or do something as an 
immediate consequence, but we treat the words conceptually and instrumentally 
(Attridge 2002, 56). 
As such, language used in this way remains restricted by the pre-existence of the world in which 
it finds itself and which it serves. The performance of singularity in the event of literature, on the 
other hand, manifests the fundamental irresponsibility of the principle of performance and, in 
doing so, ‘it disjoins the cultural matrix to the point of allowing alterity to arise’ (Attridge 2002, 
59). Derrida names this the ‘duty of irresponsibility’, which, he says, ‘is perhaps the highest form 
of responsibility’ (Derrida 1992, 38). And if literature is the institution that, in principle, allows 
everything to be said, then poetry might be considered—and often has been—the mode in which 
that radical freedom has been articulated most potently. As David Constantine has put it: 
Poetry being made of words and those words being open to all to use as they 
please, I might distinguish the language of poetry, in comparison with other kinds 
of language, by calling it unrestricted. Most other discourse—writing or speaking—
is determined, which in practice means restricted, by function, the requirements 
of a particular occasion, or by office. (Constantine 2013, 98) 
In this light, both performance, as defined through Plato, and literature, understood in the age of 
high theory, seem to assert and safeguard a certain principle of heterogeneity. Literature, of 
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course, evidently lacks many of the characteristics we associate with performance, such as 
liveness, embodiment, witnessing, participation, and so on, but all of these things can be seen 
simply as mechanisms for intensifying the various tensions that might emerge between the 
autotelic act or experience and the social, cultural and political environment in which they occur. 
It is in those tensions—the condition of the possibility of which is the deliberately autotelic act 
(the principle of performance, in other words)—that performance, and indeed performativity, 
finds its evental potential. For all of the heterogeneity of unbounded performance, performativity 
itself ultimately remains bound within the horizon of the possible (see Derrida 2002, 234–5). It is 
in the tension between the performance and its social, cultural, political environment that 
eventality becomes possible. 
The contemporary quarrel between performance (philosophy) and literature? 
The heady days of high theory, and its idealisation of literature as the discourse which must 
supplement or even supplant philosophy, have, of course, long-since receded. The once-
prevalent belief in a rapprochement in both theory and practice between philosophy and the 
principle of performance in a particular conception of literature came to seem like a gloriously 
improbable dream. The movement identified as Performance Philosophy, however, seems to 
announce a new attempt at suturing the originary rupture between philosophy and performance. 
It offers a framework for investigating performance as ‘the dramatic embodiment of ideas’ and as 
‘the event of thinking [...] inscribed in flesh and voice’3, and it seems to answer Freddie Rokem’s 
assertion that questions such as ‘how can artistic practice be considered a form of research? and 
what kind of thinking is produced by such artistic and creative practices?’ are among the most 
pressing in the humanities today (Rokem 2010, 5). The rapid growth of Performance Philosophy 
as a movement—which has resulted in major international conferences, a burgeoning research 
network, a dedicated book series, and, now, its very own journal—suggests that this is a prospect 
that many people, quite understandably, find very enticing.  
The underlying concern motivating this paper, and it can only be gestured towards by way of 
conclusion, is that this paratactical conjoining of performance with philosophy may, 
unintentionally, impose restrictions upon performance that negate or compromise its 
autotelicity, thereby undermining the very principle of performance itself—the principle that, in 
freeing performance of philosophical conditioning, renders performance most philosophically 
potent. If the foregoing account of performance is at all credible, this would be an unwitting 
reiteration, or citation, of the culmination of the ancient quarrel, where the principle of 
performance was excluded in an act of founding, definitional violence. In light of the recent 
theoretical efforts to enshrine the principle of performance in an idealised conception of 
‘literature’, any threat of a reiteration of this ancient quarrel might perhaps be framed in terms of 
a potential quarrel between Performance Philosophy and literature. If, on the other hand, it can 
be argued that Performance Philosophy imposes no such restrictions, philosophy—or, rather, a 
philosophical function—being compatible with the principle of performance, then Performance 
Philosophy might be understood as re-citing the recent but apparently exhausted ideals of the 
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theory explosion, substituting ‘literature’ with ‘performance’. This, too, could be construed as (at 
least having the makings of) a quarrel. But if Performance Philosophy cultivates an awareness of 
its own genealogies, it could also be an opportunity—a bold and timely counter-textual challenge 
to the often all-too-vapid post-literary theoretical humanities. Either way, what is clear is that 
Performance Philosophy, particularly as it inaugurates its own journal—a foundational gesture 
that, inevitably, evokes disciplinary legitimacy and academic respectability—would perhaps do 
well to be wary of unwitting citations. 
 
Notes 
1 In fact, translations vary. It is translated in this way in the Oxford edition (Plato 1998, 607b). The Loeb edition 
renders it: ‘there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry’ (Plato 1942, 465). In the Cambridge 
edition, generally favoured in this essay, it is ‘a long-standing antagonism between poetry and philosophy’ (Plato 
2003, 607b). 
2 Here we might recall Blanchot’s comment that literature ‘lay[s] claim not only to the sky, the earth, to the past, 
the future, to physics and philosophy—this would be little—but to everything, to the whole that acts in every 
instant and every phenomenon (Novalis)’ (2008, 355). 
3 These lines are taken from the Call for Papers for the Theater, Performance, Philosophy, Conference, which took 
place in Paris, 26–28 June 2014. An earlier version of this paper was presented there, and I remain grateful to 
the organisers and participants for their valuable feedback. 
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